million (5 billion Marks) per year. 3 Keynes, however, did not account for the inflation which boosted this figure. After 1924, when the currency had been stabilized, the annual payments to veterans and surviving dependants amounted to around several hundred million RM annually. 4 In view of the question pursued here, it has to be stressed that these costs were not related to the Treaty of Versailles and that it is in any case doubtful whether payments to veterans and surviving dependants would have reduced the revanchists' appetite for military power. However, it should be noted that in the second half of the 1920s, contemporaries seem to have hardly ever discussed the issue of saved military costs, neither in the media nor in the Reichstag. 5 While the subject may have cropped up in contemporary debate from time to time, it certainly did not make its way into the history books. 6 The fact that this topic has never been discussed is all the more astonishing as there are at least two academic debates on the disastrous impact that public finances had on German politics. First, there has been a large and productive discussion sparked by Knut
Borchardt about whether Chancellor Brüning, who was in office from March 1930 to May 1932, had feasible alternatives to his procyclical economic policy that aggravated the dire economic situation. Those who agree with Borchardt that Brüning did not have much room for manoeuvre stress that the precarious situation of the Reich budget restrained Brüning enormously. 7 This was all the more so given that large swathes of the public were hostile to expansionary fiscal policies that were believed to have led to inflation in the period from the end of the First World War until 1923. Secondly, the precarious state of the Reich's finances is believed to have contributed to the banking crisis of July 1931, during which Germany had to abandon the gold standard. 8 In both debates the Reich's finances and the inability of the governments to build up any reserves in the so-called 'golden years' of the 1920s play a pivotal role.
The question of why Germany's finances were in such a desperate state is usually explained by a number of factors ranging from the structural weaknesses of the German economy inherited from the pre-1914 Empire to excessively generous welfare spending.
Nobody questions the fact that reparations placed a burden on the Reich budget (and neither do we). Hence the significance of the question addressed here is obvious: if we find that the involuntary restriction of the army to 100,000 men led to a substantial alleviation of public finances, then the case for political failure is considerably strengthened, as Weimar's politicians were unable to benefit from the peace dividend offered by the Treaty of Versailles.
More specifically, this article addresses two questions. Firstly, how large were the savings for the German central budget, and secondly, how do they compare to the reparation burden? In order to assess the net effects for the central budget, it will also be necessary to discuss briefly the fiscal repercussion effects of increased additional military spending.
Certainly, these research questions are profoundly ahistorical. Without the restrictions of The next section is devoted to a brief description of the historical setting. This addresses the financing of the army in the late German Empire and discusses how the Weimar Republic dealt with those stipulations of the Treaty of Versailles that had continuous economic effects. In section III, our approach to assessing the savings effects of the military restriction is discussed in more detail, and several conceptual and methodological problems are addressed. We develop two counterfactual scenarios that will be filled with data in section IV, in which the net effects of saved military costs are compared to the reparation payments. Section V contains an analysis of possible economic repercussion effects that additional military spending might have had on public budgets, finding that even under quite rigorous assumptions the net economic burden of the Treaty of Versailles was much less heavy than has been hitherto thought, in particular if we confine our perspective to the Reich's budget. Section VI concludes.
II
After unification in 1871, Germany quickly became one of Europe's leading powers. The image of a strong, even aggressive national state, however, obscures the fact that Germany's military power was based on a surprisingly fragile fiscal constitution. The
German Empire was a federal state, the Reich, dominated by its largest member state, Prussia. Prussia's electoral law attributed voting power in favour of the elites (because votes were weighted according to the taxes one paid), and thus was much more able to keep the feared socialists at bay than was the Reich, which had a more democratic electoral law. Hence Prussia was very keen to keep the federal state financially dependent-the Reich was called the Kostgänger (boarder) of the member states. In particular, the member states kept their hands on the high-yielding income taxes, which were suited better than any other tax to securing the public share of a seemingly everincreasing national income. In broad terms one can say that the revenues of the member states relied on a mixture of direct taxes, indirect taxes, and the surplus of public operations (such as the very profitable Prussian railways), while the Reich budget was mainly confined to a number of important indirect taxes, in particular customs revenues.
9
The safeguarding of national security was the main task of the Reich. In the course of The prospect of having to pay large reparations had an important impact on Germany's fiscal constitution. It was obvious that the Reich, not the member states, would have to pay the reparations so that the fundamental fiscal reform which had been discussed for at least two decades became unavoidable. In these reforms, which took place in 1919-20, the Reich's fiscal position was accordingly reversed; now it was the member states who depended on central fiscal grants.
12
The democratization of Germany and the centralization of her finances, however, did not lead to a more transparent budget, at least in view of military expenditure. In the years preceding the First World War, the federal government did not have any incentive to conceal the armaments programmes. Within Germany they were approved by the elites, and outside Germany the expenditure would have been perceived as a sign of military strength. After the war, when Germany was restricted to a 100,000-man army, a number of secret rearmament programmes had to be camouflaged in the budget.
Historical research after the Second World War has uncovered these items. In financial terms, the sums spent in the 1920s on secret rearmament programmes, the 'X-budget', never exceeded 10 per cent of the ordinary (and disclosed) military budget. 13 Hence military and economic historians found that the German military only insignificantly exceeded the limits of the Treaty of Versailles before 1933.
14

III
If we want to analyse the extent to which the reparations imposed by the Treaty of Versailles constrained the German governments' fiscal room for manoeuvre, we also have to ask to what extent the restriction of the army to 100,000 men relieved the German budget. Therefore we need a symmetrical counterfactual in which Germany no longer had to pay reparations and was free to determine the size of its military expenditure (depicted in figure 1 ).
11 Treaty of Versailles, articles 231-47 (quotation from article 231). 12 Holtfrerich, 'Modernization', pp. 126, 133-5. 13 Nuss, Militär, pp. 190, 220, 340, 345; Zeidler, Reichswehr, p. 207 Moreover, as indicated above, the fiscal structure of German public finances was totally redesigned, which renders any effort to compare budgets before and after the war meaningless for our purposes. The most adequate measure is undoubtedly the ratio of military expenditure to GDP (henceforth 'expenditure ratio'). Sources: Table 2 .
We thus derive a grid of pre-and postwar ratios for Germany and several other European countries which allows us to assess a counterfactual estimate for the unconstrained German postwar ratios. This leads to an endogeneity problem. Had
Germany been free to allocate as many resources to rearmament as it wished, this might have increased the armaments efforts of its neighbours. We thus construct two sets of counterfactual estimates, which are designed according to whether or not Germany's neighbours perceived it as peaceful.
IV
As a first step in the analysis, it is necessary to assess the magnitude of the reparation payments and their sources. March of the following year. Source : Reichshaushaltsrechnung (1925 : Reichshaushaltsrechnung ( -1930 .
The expenditure side of the Reich budget was affected by the first two items only (line 6, total A). Railway obligations and industry obligations were forced loans that the newly founded Deutsche Reichsbahn and German manufacturing firms had to take out to pay their share of the reparations. Interest and debt repayment were de facto taxes. The obligations as well as the other financial assets were not formally channeled through the budget. 17 Without the reparation burden, however, the Reich would not have been forced to levy the obligations, or would have been in a position to spend the revenues from the obligations otherwise. In any case, Weimar's politicians were free to change the fiscal constitution accordingly. Ignoring these items simply because they were not a formal part of the budget is thus not very sensible. Henceforth, we discriminate between the formal fiscal burden on the Reich budget, total A, and the fiscal burden on what we call the 'central budget', total B. While it may be useful to look only at the Reich budget for questions pertaining to the fiscal margins of Weimar's governments, the concept of the central budget is probably more meaningful for most fiscal and economic issues.
We now turn to the counterfactual additional military costs that an unconstrained Germany would have faced. The military ratios show that the restriction to 100,000 men made-in relative termsthe German army of the 1920s the smallest one in Europe. As the ratios for France and the UK decreased only slightly between 1912/13 and 1924, one might be tempted to put the hypothetical unconstrained German military ratio at about 1.0 which means the actual size times five, that is, nearly 600,000 men (in 1912, for a larger Germany, 720,000).
It would be premature, however, to inflate the counterfactual German military expenditure by a factor of five as well. The strategy of the German military after 1919
was to work with a well-equipped rump army so that, once the 100,000-men constraint was removed, the ranks could be filled quickly with fresh recruits. Hence, despite the restrictions on heavy weapons such as battleships, submarines, tanks, and aircrafts, the capital intensity of the German army was probably higher than that of its counterparts. Stevenson, Armaments, p. 6, who use net national product rather than GDP, convert (1) NNP into constant prices and (2) all currencies into sterling, neither of which are necessary for our purposes and may even lead to distortions. 21 The multiplication factors a and b are derived from the ratio of the counterfactual expenditure ratios to the actual expenditure ratios; that is, 2.72/0.93 -1 = 1.92 for scenario a, 3.28/0.93 -1 = 2.53 for scenario b.
Having derived the multiplication factors a (190 per cent) and b (250 per cent), we are now able to compute Germany's counterfactual military expenses in the second half of the 1920s and set them in relation to the reparation payments (table 3) . In a democracy, the legitimization for defence spending is that the military protects the country against external threats. This would undoubtedly have been the argument of Weimar's politicians to enforce additional military expenditure had they been free to do so. However, we have the benefit of hindsight. Before Hitler came to power, Germany had not been attacked by foreign powers, nor had it been the subject of military extortion after 1923. In fact, the Treaty of Versailles served as a protection device for Germany, as France and The UK (and indirectly the US as their creditor) had an interest in receiving the reparation payments, which was a credible deterrent for potential invaders from other countries. Hence the 100,000-man army was fully sufficient for defensive purposes. Table 4 illustrates the capacity utilization in German industry and commerce. Notes: a July to December only. Capacity utilization measured by ratio of workers actually employed to potential workplaces in the first line, and elsewhere by ratio of hours actually worked to potential hours.
Sources: First line Balderston, Origins, p. 373, col. B; all other Wagemann, Konjunkturstatistisches Handbuch, According to Balderston's estimates (first line), German firms were on average working close to capacity, and additional military procurement would have simply crowded out civilian orders. This fits with anecdotal evidence that German industrialists were reluctant 23 In fact, rather than earning current account surpluses to finance the reparations Germany attracted large foreign capital inflows so that her foreign debt was commercialized; see Ritschl, '"Dancing on a volcano"'. Yet the massive inflows of foreign capital affected the central budgets at best indirectly via higher tax revenues and higher interest costs. to seek military procurement contracts. Only later, in the course of the great slump, did industrialists seek to contact the army.
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However, a closer inspection of industrial capacity utilization reveals that at least in some businesses military procurement might have been welcome. In the second half of 1928, the first period for which detailed branch data are available, the capacity utilization in vehicles, instruments and optics, and the textile industry was far below the average (table   4) .
Hence, for the sake of the argument, it might make sense to assume that an increase in we nevertheless assume a value of one, which is presumably quite high, in particular for armaments expenditure. 27 The tax quota amounted to 15 per cent throughout the second half of the 1920s. 28 Table 5 replicates the results of table 3 assuming that 50 per cent of the additional taxes went into the central budgets. Lines 4 and 5 include additional military costs net of additional tax revenues which flow back to the central budgets.
In both lines 6 and 7, the sign reverses one year earlier than in table 3, but the main results remain unchanged. In 1929, the net burden of the reparations compared to unrestricted rearmament turns out at some 700 million (peaceful scenario a') or 300 million (aggressive scenario b') RM. In the latter case, and viewed over the whole period, the payment of reparations is still 0.65 billion RM less costly than having an unrestricted army. If one confines the perspective to the Reich budget, the starting point of our analysis, the main finding is still unequivocally that paying reparations was cheaper than financing the build-up of a new, powerful German army. Figure 3 illustrates this for the fiscal year 1927/8, the peak of the Weimar Republic's business cycle. Although additional military spending leads to an increase in the Reich budget due to induced tax revenues, 25 Hansen, Reichswehr, ; see also Nuss, Militär, p. 191. 26 Ritschl, Deutschlands Krise, pp. 58, 67. 27 Note that we neglect the substantial savings that emerge from a reduction of unemployment and welfare relief had more soldiers been on the military payroll.
what remains for non-defence purposes becomes smaller, as the additional military costs are larger than the waived reparation payments. The receipt-expenditure accounting of the Reich is systematically conceived in such a way that it first depicts the receipts, followed by the expenditures of the different discrete According to the scheme described earlier, the extraordinary receipts are followed by the extraordinary expenditures in four subsections, A-D. The declared totals are included in table 3, line 3. Overall, they sum up to the total expenditure budget of the Reich Ministry of the Armed Forces.
How total defence expenditure is calculated
For the period 1924-7, the war burden is recorded in a separate budget. This second budget consists of book entries which are represented in the primary budget within the subsection 'General Financial Administration'. Consequently, this leads to a prolongation of the overall budget.
In order to derive meaningful ratios of the discrete budgets in relation to the overall expenditures, this step has to be reversed. This can be achieved by subtracting the expenditures of the war burden budget from the sum of all expenditures. In order to be able to compare the discrete budgets with each other, it is necessary to subtract the war burden expenditures from the expenditures of the 'General Financial Administration'.
The war burden budget
The ordinary part of the war burden budget for the period 1924-7 includes, as an 
